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In this study we derive measures of the redistributive effect of taxes and welfare expenditures for the U.S. 
using CPS data for the years 1994, 1999 and 2004. We find that whilst income inequality increased, the
redistributive effect of taxes and public transfers together reduced market income inequality by 
approximately 30 percent. In 2004, 88 percent of the net redistributive effect resulted from public transfers 
and 12 percent from taxes. The total redistributive eff ct would have improved by 35 percent in 2004 if, all 




1.  Introduction 
 Taxation and government expenditure on welfare are the two major redistributive 
policy instruments to reduce inequality and ensure a more equitable distribut on of 
income and other resources. In the assessment of redistributive polici s, two fundamental 
principles are often discussed: equity and efficiency. Equity relates to the fair distribution 
of resources, while efficiency is concerned about losses due to distortion in economic 
behaviors in the process of redistribution of the resources, and can be considered as a 
secondary objective or a means to achieve equity as a primary gol (Le Grand, 1991).2 
Equity in measuring distributional justice of redistributive policies has two dimensions: 
vertical and horizontal equity. For vertical equity, redistributive policies should levy 
appropriately more taxes from the richer and provide appropriately more benefits to the 
poorer. For horizontal equity, redistributive policy should “levy identical taxes or provide 
identical transfers to all units with the same level of well-being” (Plotnick, 1985).  
 In this study of the redistributive effects of U.S. taxes and public transfers and 
their horizontal and vertical components, we use measurement theory developed by 
Urban and Lambert (2005). This methodology extends earlier work of Kakwani (1977, 
                                                
1 We thank Neil Bania and Jean Stockard for encouragement, and Ivica Urban and Felice Russo for helpful advice on methodology. 
2 In the 1970s, the dominant view in economics was th t there was a trade-off between equity and efficincy. As it is well known, Okun 
(1975) described redistribution to be carrying money from the rich to the poor in a “leaky bucket”. However, many literature from the late 
1990s have argued that the trade-off does not exist ( .g. Kakwani & Pernia, 2000). 
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1984) and Aronson et al. (1994), by relaxing the requirement of these earlier studies that 
the recipients of pre-tax and pre-transfer income be partitioned into exact equals groups 
for the purposes of measuring horizontal fiscal effects; we use clos equals groups. 
Additionally, an approach due to Lambert (1985) is adapted, whereby the net 
redistributive effect of the tax and benefit system can be decomposed into the 
contributions of taxes and benefits separately. We use U.S. Current Population Survey 
data over three periods: the 1995, 2000, and 2005 survey years.  
 Our results show that inequality in market income distribution has increased 
during the last ten years in the U.S., while the redistributive effect of taxes and public 
transfers slightly decreased. Approximately 88 percent of total redistributive effect 
resulted from public transfers including public assistance and social insurance programs. 
However, the role of public assistance was quite small. Total redist ibutive effect could 
be increased 35 percent if horizontal inequities in taxes and public transfers would be 
eliminated. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review U.S. taxes and 
benefits, and describe their salient features in terms of reducing income inequality. In 
Section 3, the relevant measurement theory is briefly summarized. In Section 4, 
implementation issues are considered. In Section 5, we present our main esults. Section 
6 contains sensitivity analysis, to determine the extent to which our results may be 
conditioned by the particular normative and empirical choices we made. In the final 
Section 7, we summarize our findings, discuss their implications and draw conclusions.  
 
2.  Redistributive policy and income inequality in the U.S. 
 According to Kakwani (1986), government redistributive policies can be 
classified into two categories. The first category includes “the policies that have direct 
impact on the working of markets generating incomes. . . These policies change the 
distribution of factor incomes by altering the prices and supply of go ds and factors”. 
Examples in this category include minimum wage legislation, subsidized interest rates for 
home buyers and wage indexation. The second category includes “fiscal poli ies that 
redistribute factor incomes received by individuals through market operations”. Direct 
and indirect taxes and various income support welfare programs belong to this category. 
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These “fiscal policies have relatively little direct effect on the process of price and 
income formation” (ibid, p.1).  
 In this study, we focus on redistributive policies belonging to Kakwani’s second 
category, those which redistribute by means of taxation and public transfers, the latter 
comprising both cash and non-cash social welfare benefits.3 Social welfare policies in the 
U.S. are various and complex, and can be classified into public assistance, social 
insurance, and social service program categories.  
 Public assistance goes to people who are poor according to legal standards, with 
funds coming from general tax revenues. Major cash public assistance programs include 
Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
TANF was established in 1996, as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWOR), and was consolidated with Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) and 
Emergency Assistance. A poor family can receive TANF “only if it ncludes a minor 
child or pregnant person” (United States House of Representatives. Committee on Ways 
and Means., 2004). SSI provides cash benefits for low income people who are elde ly, 
blind, or disabled. Along with the above, there are several in-kind public assistance 
programs to the poor such as Food Stamps, Medicaid, Public Housing and nutritional 
programs.4   
 Social insurance programs protect people against the risk of income loss due to 
old age, disability, unemployment, death of a breadwinner, work-related injury and 
sickness (Blau & Abramovitz, 2004). They are characterized by compulsory contribution 
and the absence of a means test. The major social insurance programs in the U.S. include 
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), Medicare, Unemployment 
Insurance (UI), and Worker’s Compensation. 
 Social service programs provide care, training, and assistance to th  poor as well 
as the elderly, children, the sick, and disabled. Child care and development, family 
services, community service, care for the elderly, job training, le al services, mental 
                                                
3 Payroll taxes and social welfare benefits may redistribute over lifetimes and between generations as well between income groups in a 
given year, but we neglect intertemporal aspects here.  
4 TANF is jointly funded by the federal government ad the individual states. SSI is a federal program.  General Assistance (GA) 
programs are state and local level cash and in-kind public assistance, which are designed to meet the needs of low income people who are 
ineligible for federally funded programs like TANF and SSI. As of 1998, 35 states had state GA programs (Karger & Stoesz, 2005).  
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health, public health, and vocational rehabilitation are included in the scope of social 
services (DiNitto & Dye, 1987).  
 Among all of these social welfare programs, public assistance is the primary one 
to redistribute to low income groups from the higher income groups. According to the 
Green book (United States House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and Means., 
2004), there are some 85 means-tested benefit programs in the United Sta es, as of 2002. 
Besides the above programs, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which subsidizes 
labor supply for low-income families, is the other major redistribu ive public transfer 
program, though usually it is regarded as a tax policy rather than a public assistance 
program (Gruber, 2005). 
 Tax policy is fundamental to the structure of social welfare, because it generates 
revenues for public expenditures. According to Gruber (2005), there are five types of 
taxation, distinguished from each other as follows. Payroll taxes ar  levied on the 
earnings of workers, and are the primary means of financing social insurance programs. 
Individual income tax is paid by individuals or families on broader sources of income 
accrued during the year as well as on earnings. Corporate income tax is levied on the 
earnings of corporations. Wealth taxes are paid on the value of assets held by persons. 
They include property taxes (based on the value of land and built str c ures) and estate 
taxes (based on inheritances). Finally, consumption tax is paid on individual or household 
consumption of goods and services. The most common type of consumption tax is the 
sales tax, paid by consumers to vendors at the point of sale. On the other hand, excise tax 
is levied on the sales of particular goods, such as cigarettes or gasoline.  
 As shown in Table 1, most revenues for the U.S. as a whole are raised by income 
taxation, followed by payroll taxes, consumption taxes, wealth taxes, nd corporate taxes. 
Across all levels of government, the U.S. receives about two-thirds of it revenues from 
individual income and payroll taxes. On average in the OECD, consumption taxes occupy 
a greater portion of national government revenue than in the U.S, and publicsocial 
expenditure and taxation ratios to GDP are typically higher.5 
 
                                                
5 On the other hand, private social spending plays a much more substantial role in the U.S. than in the OECD generally. See Adema and 
Ladaique (2005) for more on these international aspect .  
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Table 1. Tax Revenues by Types of Tax, 2001 











U.S. 24.6% 42.3% 6.5% 10.6% 16.1% 
   Federal 35.9% 51.4% 7.8% 1.4% 3.4% 
   State and local - 26.0% 4.4% 31.6% 38.0% 
OECD average 26.7% 26.0% 9.3% 5.5% 32.6% 
Source: Gruber (2005) 
 
The concepts of inequality, poverty and welfare are closely related as well as distinct 
(Litchfield, 1999). Inequality has shown a secular increase in the United States, 
particularly from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, whilst the poverty rate has risen and 
social mobility has shown little change (Gottschalk 1997, Nielsen and Alderson 1997, 
Harrison and Bluestone 1988). According to Förster and d’Ercole (2005), overall income 
inequality in the U.S. showed moderate increase during the mid 1970s to mid 1990s, and 
no change from the mid 1990s to 2000. See Graph 1, which uses Census data.6  
 
Graph 1. Change in Income Inequality for Families: 1947-1998 
 
Source: Jones & Weinberg (2000), based on Current Population Survey data 
Note: Change in data collection methodology suggests that the pre-1993 and post-1992 estimates are not comparable. 
 
                                                
6 The U.S. exhibits greater income inequality than many other developed countries. In 2000, for example, the U.S. income distribution was 
fourth most unequal among 25 OECD countries, exceeded only by Poland, Turkey, and Mexico: see OECD (2005). 
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 The Census Bureau’s own research using CPS data indicates that government 
transfers and taxes in 2003 reduced income inequality by 0.104 Gini points (20 percent) 
compared to the pre-tax and pre-transfer income distribution (Cleveland, 2005), a greater 
reduction than that occasioned by the tax system. See Table 2: in 2003, for example, 
subtracting taxes lowers the Gini coefficient for income by 4.6 percent (from 0.498 to 
0.475), while including transfers lowers it by 17 percent (from 0.475 to 0.394). Our study 
will amplify upon and inform these overall, broad-brush indicators. 
Table 2. Gini coefficient and Redistributive Effect of Taxes and Transfers: 1979-2003 
 1979 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Income (1):  
pre-tax and 
pre-transfers 
0.460 0.462 0.486 0.487 0.509 0.509 0.510 0.498 0.498 
Income (2): 
(1) - Taxes 






0.359 0.354 0.392 0.382 0.394 0.412 0.412 0.394 0.394 





16.3% 17.7% 14.8% 18.0% 18.1% 15.6% 16.1% 16.9% 17.1% 
Source: Adapted from U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006), Historical Income Tables – Experimental Measure (table RDI-5), 
Accessed at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/rdi5.html 
 
3.  Measurement theory 
 Since the days of Musgrave and Thin (1948), redistributive effects have
commonly been measured by comparing the Gini coefficients XG and X TG − for original 
(pre-tax and pre-transfer) and final (post-tax and post-transfer) income respectively: 
(1) RE = GX - GX-T , 
RE  may then be decomposed across taxes and benefits, and into vertical and horizontal 
components. A brief sketch of the appropriate measurement theory is as follows. 
 For a tax function T(x) such that both tax payments and post-tax incomes x - T(x) 
increase with pre-tax income, Kakwani (1977) defined progressivity as disproportionality 
in taxes: 
(2) KT T XP G G= − ,  
where GT is the Gini coefficient for taxes, and he linked this measure with redistributive 
effect as follows: 











where t is the overall average tax rate. 
 If the tax system is such that the rank orderings of individuals by their incomes 
before and after taxes are different, Kakwani’s model does not apply. Kakwani (1984) 
showed that, in such a case, redistributive effect can be decomposed into vertical equity, 
through his disproprtionality measure, along with a term to capture the extent of 
reranking: 
(4) . [ ]
1
K K K
X X T X T X T
t
RE G G P G C V R
t− − −
= − = − − = −
−
, 
in which TC  and X TC − are the concentration indexes for taxes and post-tax incomes, 
K
T XP C G= −  and 
K
X X TV G C −= − , which differs from RE  precisely when the tax 
system induces rerankings, which are captured by 0KR ≥ . 
 Aronson et al. (1994) refined this decomposition. For a population partitioned 
into pre-tax equals groups, there are in fact three contributions to redistributive effect:  
(5) ( ).1
K K A A
X X T T x E x T
t
RE G G P G R V H R
t
α−= − = − ⋅ − = − −− ∑
. 
The vertical term KTV  measures the inequality reduction that would have obtained if each 
member of each equals group E(x) had paid the same tax, the mean of the actual taxes 
paid by the group. In the middle term ,AH  which measures classical (pure) horizontal 
inequity, the weighted sum is of post-tax Gini coefficients across pre-tax equals groups 
(where αx is the product of the population share and post-tax income share of the 
members of E(x)), and reranking is A X T X TR G C− −= − , which is as before except that 
for the new situation X TC −  is defined with respect to the lexicographic ordering of 
income units, first by pre-tax income and then, among pre-tax equals, by post-tax 
income.7 
 Urban and Lambert (2005), to which we refer henceforth as UL, adjusted this 
methodology to allow for the fact that it is by necessity close equals rather than exact 
                                                
7 The model of Aronson et al. has been widely applied. For example, Wagstaff et al. (1999) use it to compare the income tax systems 
of twelve OECD countries, Hyun and Lim (2005) applied it to Korea’s income tax system, and van Doorslae  et al. (1999) use it to 
present the income redistribution consequences of health care finance in twelve OECD countries. 
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equals which must be used to define the H term (since there are typically few or no exact 
equals in real-world data sets). In this setting, rerankings may occur within close equals 
groups as well as between them (i.e. rerankings of entire groups). New measures capture 
these effects among close equals,8 and in combination with the term RA in the Aronson et 
al. decomposition, they define the reranking measure invoked in Kakwani (1984). The 
decomposition of redistributive effect advocated by UL and used in this paper takes the 
form: 
(6)   KRE V H R= − − , 
in which the vertical and horizontal components H  and V differ slightly from those in 
(5), due to the close equals environment, but they sum to Kakwani’s KV  as in (4).  
 The UL model extends readily from taxes to benefits and to the net fiscal system. 
In Lambert (1985), net redistributive effect ( )LNV  is decomposed into separate 
contributions for taxes and benefits, involving Kakw ni indices for each as well as 
























Here t denotes average tax rate as before, b denotes the average benefit rate, KTP and 
K



















the respective measures of redistributive effect.9   
 
 
4.  Implementation issues 
 We shall measure inequality and redistributive effects of taxes and welfare 
transfer programs in the U.S. using Current Population Survey data. Household incomes 
will be transformed into living standard using a needs-based equivalence scale, and the 
income unit will be the equivalent adult (Ebert, 1997) for which we need to modify the 
                                                
8 See the Appendix, which defines all component measaure  invoked by UL, in particular the measures RWG and REG referred to here.  
9 Lambert (1985) demonstrated the unsuitability of  the Kakwani index for measuring net progressivity: “..since total net benefits may 
be positive, zero or negative, and certainly net benefits will be negative at some income levels, there a e considerable problems in 
defining a concentration curve for net benefits, or otherwise measuring their ‘deviation from proportionality’”( ibid, p.44). All of the 
measures featuring in (6) are further described in Lambert (2001, chapter 11). See Jenkins (1988) and also Ankrom (1993) for the 
introduction of reranking contributions (of taxes and benefits) into the Lambert (1985) model. 
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CPS sample weights. Sensitivity analysis will explore the variations of the results when 
the scope of taxes and public transfers, the equivalence scale and the close equals groups 
are varied. Our major results will then be compared with those of previous studies. 
 We use the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data of the U.S. Census Bureau for the survey years 1995, 
2000, and 2005. The CPS is primarily a labor force survey, used to compute the federal 
government’s official monthly unemployment statistic , along with other estimates of 
labor force characteristics. In addition to its core content, a different supplement is 
fielded each month. One of these, the ASEC Supplement, formerly known as the March 
Annual Demographic Supplement, is currently the official source of estimates on income 
and poverty in the United States.10 The CPS collects data for the prior calendar year for 
about 35 cash and in-kind sources. Non-cash benefit and tax values are calculated by 
using the corresponding sources, and are added to the survey data set. The sample sizes 
and observation units we use are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. The CPS ASEC Sample Size and Analyzed Household Size 
 
Sample Size Excluded households(B)  
Person Family Household(A) Non-interviewed group quarter 
Analyzed households (A-B) 
1995 149,642 63,756 72,152 15,211 68 56,873 
2000 133,710 58,093 64,994 13,978 38 50,978 
2005 210,648 87,149 98,664 22,217 60 76,387 
Source: each year’s CPS dataset from http://www.bls.cen us.gov/cps/suppmain.htm 
 
 
 The CPS records income data at the individual, family, and household levels. 
Although the ultimate unit of welfare is the individual, this is not the appropriate income 
unit for distributional analysis (Atkinson et al., 1995). We use the equivalent adult as the 
income unit. The time unit is the year: income stati ics for the 1995, 2000, and 2005 
survey years refer to receipts during the preceding calendar years, 1994, 1999, and 2004. 
 
                                                
10 While the other representative income data source, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) collects income data every 
four months through a panel, the CPS income supplements interviews once a year. Unlike SIPP, CPS is design d to be representative 
within the states (U.S Census Bureau 2001 and 2005a).  
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Figure 1.  Basic Definitions of Income 
 
 
 We frame everything in terms of income and not consumption, wealth or any 
other welfare indicator. The following income concepts are used: i) market income, ii) 
post-tax income, iii) post-transfer income, iv) disposable income. See Figure 1 and 
Atkinson et al. (1995). The formal definitions, which accord with e U.S. Census 
Bureau’s documentation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005a, 2005b), are as follows: 
i) Market Income = money income11 + capital gains and losses + return on home equity – 
work expenses – public cash transfers 
ii) Post-tax Income = market income – payroll tax – property tax – income tax + tax 
credit  
iii) Post-transfer Income = market income + public cash transfers (means-tested and non-
means-tested)12 + public non-cash transfers 
iv) Disposable Income = market income + public transfers (cash and non-cash) – tax 
(payroll tax, property tax and income tax including tax credit)13 
                                                
11 According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2005a), money i come data of individuals who are 15 years or over includes  the following 
sources: (1) money wages or salary; (2) net income from non-farm self-employment; (3) net income from farm self-employment; (4) 
Social Security or railroad retirement; (5) Supplemental Security Income; (6) public assistance or welfar  payments; (7) interest (on 
savings or bonds); (8) dividends, income from estat or trusts, or net rental income; (9) veterans' payment or unemployment and 
workmen's compensation; (10) private pensions or government employee pensions; (11) alimony or child support, regular contributions 
from persons not living in the household, and other periodic income. 
12 Means-tested cash transfers include payments from public assistance, including TANF, SSI and some Veterans’ Payments. Non-means-
tested cash transfers include Unemployment Compensatio , State Workers’ Compensation, Social Security, some Veterans’ Payments, 
government survivor, disability, and pension payments, and educational assistance.  Non-cash transfers include food stamps, housing 
subsidies, free or reduced-price school lunches, Medicaid and Medicare. See U.S. Census Bureau (2005b).  
13 Estimates of taxes and the value of non-cash benefits are not included in the CPS data but are added  from information provided by other 
agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 









+ Means-Tested Cash Transfers 
+ Non-Means-Tested Cash Transfers 
+ Non-cash transfers 
- Income Tax + Tax Credit 
- Property Tax 
- Payroll Tax 
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 In a broad sense, means-tested transfers refer to public assistance benefits and 
non-means-tested transfers to social insurance benefits. Four types of taxes are included: 
federal individual income tax, state individual income taxes, payroll tax and property tax 
on owner-occupied housing. The Earned Income Tax Credit is added to each level of 
income taxes.  
 Household incomes14  are converted into a common base measuring living 
standard, or equivalent income, by deflating by factors which reflect differences in 
household needs attributable to size and composition. A range of possible judgments 
about the needs of households with different sizes and composition are accommodated by 
parametric equivalence scales such as those of Buhman et al. (1988) and Cutler and Katz 
(1992). Let economic well-being W be measured as the adjusted income of a household. 
Buhman et al. write W = Y/Se where S is household size and the elasticity e, indicating 
economies of scale, varies between 0 and 1. Cutler and Katz (1992) use the form 
(8) W = Y/z,   z = (nA + φnC)
θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 
in which nA and nC are the number of adults and children in the household and φ and θ are 
parameter values between 0 and 1 which signify the relative importance of children and 
economies of scale respectively. Setting φ = 1 in Cutler and Catz’s specification yields 
Buhman et al’s scale. We set both φ and θ equal to 0.5 here, following the practice of 
Aronson et al. (1994) and also of Wagstaff et al.(1999). 
 The Gini coefficient is used to measure inequality in each income distribution. 
There are many ways to calculate Gini coefficient from micro data. See Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1984) and Förster (2000). For sampling weights w and equivalence scale 































































                                                
14 The U.S. Census Bureau (2005a) defines the household of the CPS data as follows: “A household consists of all the people who occupy 
a housing unit. A house, an apartment or other group of rooms, or a single room, is regarded as a housing unit when it is occupied or 
intended for occupancy as separate living quarters; that is, when the occupants do not live and eat with any other persons in the structure 
and there is direct access from the outside or through a common hall.… The count of households excludes group quarters”. For example, 
unmarried couples in a housing unit are treated as two ingle person families, but as one household. 
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where Wk is the equivalent income per equivalent adult in household k (k = 1, 2, ....n), n 








 and µ is mean income overall.  
 In calculating redistributive effects using Urban d Lambert’s (2005) close 
equals model, we take account of van de Ven et al.’s (2001) warning that “an arbitrary 
specification of close equals groups can lead to misleading results” (p.381). They suggest 
setting the bandwidth for close equals groups to maxi ize the vertical component of 
redistributive effect. We follow this idea here, and identify optimal intervals for close 
equals groups by experimenting with a number of different income bandwidths along the 
pre-tax income scale, ranging from $100 to $3,000 (annually). A bandwidth of $500 for 
2004 maximizes the level of vertical effect V , adjusted to $352 (1994) and $438 (1999) 
by using median income variation rates for each year.15  
 
5.  Results 
 The main results, for all taxes and public transfers, are reported in Table 4. Here, 
as in all subsequent tables, original income is market income as previously defined.  
Table 4. Redistributive Effect of Taxes and Public Transfers 
Year 1994 1999 2004 
bandwidth $352 $438 $500 
  
  
  # of groups 1,058 1,068 1,537 
GX 0.47150    0.48989   0.50081    
GX-T 0.43839    0.45497   0.47126    
RE 0.03312  (7.02%)  0.03492  (7.13%) 0.02954  (5.90%) 
t 0.24314    0.24838   0.22828    
K
TP  0.12331    0.11640   0.11235    
K
TV   0.03961    0.03847   0.03323    
V  0.03962  (119.64%) 0.03847  (110.17%) 0.03326  (112.57%) 










RK  0.00650  (19.62%) 0.00354  (10.15%) 0.00369  (12.49%) 
GX 0.47150    0.48989    0.50081    Public 
Transfers GX+B 0.36512    0.39622   0.38774    
                                                
15 Aronson et al.(1994) used a £5 per week bandwidth to analyze 1990-91 U.K income data and the same real value for earlier years. 
Given the exchange rate for the British pound to the U.S. dollar in 1990-91 and the Consumer Price Indx in the U.S. from 1990 to 2004, 
£5 per week in 1990-1991 in the U.K. converts into approximately $665 per year in 2004 in the U.S. 
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RE 0.10638  (22.56%) 0.09367  (19.12%) 0.11307  (22.58%) 
b 0.20234    0.16788   0.20970    
K
BP  0.83636    0.86160   0.88549    
K
BV   0.14075    0.12385   0.15350    
V  0.13990  (131.51%) 0.12342  (131.76%) 0.15276  (135.10%) 









RK  0.03437  (32.31%) 0.03018  (32.22%) 0.04043  (35.76%) 
GX 0.47150   0.48989    0.50081    
GN 0.31706   0.34523   0.34196    
RE 0.15445  (32.76%) 0.14467  (29.53%) 0.15885  (31.72%) 
g 0.04080   0.08050   0.01858    
L
NV  0.20769   0.18875   0.21535   
    %T  0.03126  (15.05%) 0.03144  (16.66%) 0.02613  (12.13%) 
    %B 0.17643  (84.95%) 0.15731  (83.34%) 0.18920  (87.86%) 
V  0.20662  (133.78%) 0.18821  (130.10%) 0.21444  (135.00%) 










RK  0.05324  (34.47%) 0.04409  (30.48%) 0.05650  (35.57%) 
 
 As can be seen, inequality of market income worsened over the period. On the 
other hand, final income became slightly less unequal. The total redistributive effect of 
taxes and benefits became sharply worse between 1994 and 1999, but fully recovered by 
2004. As of 2004, equivalent adults pay an average 22.8 percent of their market income 
as taxes and receive 21 percent as benefits.  
 Between 1994 and 1999, the redistributive effect of the combined tax and transfer 
system, as expressed by RE as well as LNV , was diminished. The welfare reform of 1996 
presumably led to reduced effectiveness of public transfers; there was a reduced average 
benefit level and a slight increase in benefit regressivity. Between 1999 and 2004, the 
role of public transfers in reducing inequality recovered, and the average benefit level 
increased again. Taxes became less redistributive between 1999 and 2004, and the burden 
and progressivity both lessened. In 2004, 88 percent of the net redistributive effect 
resulted from public transfers and 12 percent from taxes; 5.5 percent of the total tax 
burden was shifted from low incomes to high incomes by the presence of progression in 
taxes, whilst 44.5 percent of total benefit expenditures was shifted from high incomes to 
low incomes by the presence of regression in the benefits. Public transfers reduced the 
level of income inequality about seven times more than taxes.   
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 The impact of differential tax and benefit treatments is seen through the values of 
horizontal inequity H and reranking RK, and their sum.16 The combined tax-transfer 
system in 2004 would have been 35 percent more redist ibutive in the absence of 
differential treatments. Reranking caused by benefits was about three times larger than 
that by taxes. Potential redistribution would have be n much higher if the inequity caused 
by reranking in the process of benefit delivery could have been eliminated.  
 
The income tax and public assistance 
 If we limit our attention to the personal income tax (federal and state, after EITC), 
and to public assistance programs (means-tested cash transfers such as TANF/AFDC and 
SSI, and non-cash transfers such as food stamps, hou ing subsidies, free or reduces-price 
school lunches and Medicaid), do we see that these programs are “doing most of the 
work”? It is generally supposed that the income tax is the most progressive component of 
the system, and that public assistance is the most regressive. If Table 4 is redone for 
income tax, public assistance, and net taxes defined as income taxes minus public 
assistance, we see that, indeed, the progressivity of income tax and the regressivity of 
public assistance are significantly larger than for all taxes and all transfers (approximately 
1.3 to 2 times as large).17 Though public assistance is strongly regressive, its proportion 
within the total public transfer system is fairly small, and as a result its inequality-
reducing effect is roughly comparable only to that coming from the income tax. The non-
income taxes – property tax and payroll tax – increase inequality rather than reduce it, 
that is, they are regressive. See Table 5.  
Table 5. Redistributive Effect of Income tax, Property Tax and Payroll Tax, 2004 
  Income tax  Property Tax Payroll tax 
GX 0.50081    0.50081    0.50081    
GX-T 0.46681    0.50677    0.50304    
RE 0.03399  (6.79%) -0.00596  (-1.19%) -0.00223  (-0.45%) 
t 0.14845   0.01984    0.06355    
K
TP  0.20565    -0.24276   -0.03131   
K
TV   0.03585   -0.00491   -0.00213   
                                                
16 Wagstaff et al. (1999)  point out that, in the Aronson et al. decomposition, the relative values of HA and RA depend on the interval chosen 
for close equals, and they advise focusing on HA + RA  to measure the gap between actual and potential redistributive effect. The value of 
RK  in our study,  which is the sum of RA, entire group reranking and within group reranking, s constant regardless of the bandwidth. 
17 Details are available from the authors on request. 
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V  0.03587 (105.51%) -0.00491  (82.38%) -0.00212  (95.23%) 
H  0.00002  (0.05%) 0.000002  (-0.04%) 0.000001  (-0.07%) 
RK  0.00186  (5.46%) 0.00105  (-17.58%) 0.00010  (-4.70%) 
 
 The discrepancies between actual redistributive effect (RE) and potential 
redistributive effect (V) are smaller for income tax and public assistance than for all taxes 
and transfers. For example, if differences in income tax treatment could have been 
eliminated in 2004, the redistributive effect of the income tax would have been increased 
by around 5.5 percent. The reranking effect in public assistance is approximately five 
times as large as that of income tax.  
 Some figures for means-tested cash transfers are shown in Table 6. Their 
regressivity is higher than that of all public assistance because the level of benefits is 
more directly determined by income than in non-cash programs. The redistributive effect 
has fallen through time, resulting from the decreasing average benefit rate and 
regressivity. There has been relatively little differential treatment in the means-tested 
cash transfer system, though the extent of it did increase sharply between 1999 and 2004. 
Table 6.  Redistributive Effect of Means-tested Cash Transfers 
 1994 1999 2004 
GX 0.47150  0.48989  0.50081  
GX+B 0.46148  0.48427  0.49535  
RE 0.01002 (2.13%) 0.00562 (1.15%) 0.00546 (1.09%) 
b 0.00944  0.00529  0.00538  
K
BP  1.17229  1.15337  1.12983  
K
BV   0.01097  0.00607  0.00605  
V  0.01083 (108.03%) 0.00603 (107.31%) 0.00600 (109.85%) 
H  -0.00014 (-1.39%) -0.00004 (-0.70%) -0.00005 (-0.96%) 
RK  0.00094 (9.42%) 0.00045 (8.01%) 0.00059 (10.81%) 
 
The Earned Income Tax Credit 
 The EITC is a refundable credit for low-income working families. Its purpose is 
to reduce poverty and provide work incentives. EITC is basically a tax policy, but is 
frequently considered as public assistance. It has become one of the largest-scale 
programs to support low-income people in the U.S. Table 7 presents figures for the EITC.  
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Table 7. Redistributive Effect of EITC  
 1994 1999 2004 
GX 0.47150    0.48989    0.50081    
GX+B 0.46804    0.48608    0.49716    
RE 0.00346  (0.73%) 0.00382  (0.78%) 0.00365  (0.73%) 
b 0.00399    0.00410    0.00407    
K
BP  0.88532    0.95181    0.91731    
K
BV   0.00352    0.00389    0.00371    
V  0.00352  (101.67%) 0.00389  (101.81%) 0.00371  (101.84%) 
H  -0.0000001  (0.00%) -0.00000002  (0.00%) 0.0000002  (0.01%) 
RK  0.00006  (1.67%) 0.00007  (1.81%) 0.00007  (1.84%) 
 
 
 EITC has a progressive phase-in range, proportional ra ge and regressive phase-
out range (see Graph 2) and is inequality-reducing, with an average rate that is slightly 
less than that of means-tested cash transfers. The discrepancies between its redistributive 
and vertical effects are quite small (approximately 2%), which results from a relatively 
low level of reranking compared to other types of benefits and taxes.  
Graph 2. Benefit Structure of Earned Income Tax Credit, in TY 2003 
 
Earned Income 
        Source: Internal Revenue Service, Recited from Berube, A. & Tiffany, T. (2004) 
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Federal and state income taxes 
Table 8. Redistributive Effect of Federal and State Income Tax, 2004 
  Federal income tax  after credit(T F) 
State income tax 
 after credit(T S) 
Total income tax18 
 after credit 
 (T=TF+TS) 
GX 0.50081    0.50081    0.50081    
GN 0.47048    0.49641    0.46482    
RE 0.03033  (6.06%) 0.00440  (0.88%) 0.03599  (7.19%) 
g 0.11418    0.03071    0.14489    
K
TP   0.24583   0.14278   0.22398    
K
TV  0.03169   0.00452   0.03795   
V 0.03170  (104.52%) 0.00453  (102.84%) 0.03797  (105.51%) 
H 0.00001  (0.04%) 0.000002  (0.05%) 0.00002  (0.05%) 
RK 0.00136  (4.47%) 0.00012  (2.79%) 0.00196  (5.46%) 
 Note: state income tax structures vary from state to state. 
 
 Table 8 compares the redistributive effects of federal and state income taxes. The 
federal income tax is more progressive than the stat income taxes in the U.S., which is in 
accord with Wagstaff et al.’s (1999) finding in some other OECD countries.19 Wagstaff 
et al. also observed that the vertical and horizontal/reranking effects, as percentages of 
the redistributive effect, were lower at the central government level than at the local level. 
We find the opposite: the vertical effect and sum of horizontal inequity and reranking are 
higher for the federal income tax than at the state lev l. The average rate of federal 
income tax was three to four times higher than thatof the state income taxes. This, in 
combination with high progressivity, results in a larger vertical effect than for the states.  
 
6.  Sensitivity Analysis 
 Using definitions of unadjusted income, taxes and public transfers all as for Table 
4, we show in Table 9 the effect on our results for 2004 of varying the equivalence scale 
parameters θ and φ. As shown, the proportion of V in RE (equivalently, the sum of H and 
R) falls in the case of taxes, and rises in the caseof benefits and net taxes, as θ increases 
and as φ decreases.20  
                                                
18 The results except for GX are slightly different from those for the income tax plus EITC due to the different scope of this tax credit 
19 Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Switzerland 
20 Aronson et al. (1994) chose the parameters θ = φ = 0.5 because they minimized H in the case of the U.K.'s personal income tax system. 
According to Burkhauser et al. (1996), the reasonable values of θ range between approximately 0.4 and 0.8.  
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Table 9. Redistributive Effect by Equivalence Scale, 2004 
θ 0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Φ - 0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 
# of equals groups 
(bandwidth=$500) 
2,252 1,892 1,892 1,537 1,537 1,454 1,454 
GX 0.53286 0.51671  0.51590  0.50081  0.50262  0.49550  0.50424  
GX-T 0.50944 0.49048  0.48899  0.47126  0.47191  0.46416  0.47193  
RE 0.02342 0.02623  0.02691  0.02954  0.03071  0.03135  0.03231  
t 0.22828 0.22828  0.22828  0.22828  0.22828  0.22828  0.22828  
K
TP  0.09269 0.10177  0.10387  0.11235  0.11587  0.11821  0.12110  
K



























































GX 0.53286 0.51671  0.51590  0.50081  0.50262  0.49550  0.50424  
GX+B 0.41902 0.40202  0.40254  0.38774  0.39437  0.38808  0.40665  
RE 0.11384 0.11469 0.11336  0.11307  0.10825  0.10742  0.09759  
b 0.20970 0.20970  0.20970  0.20970  0.20970  0.20970  0.20970  
K
BP  0.86873 0.87776  0.87510  0.88549  0.87576  0.88491  0.86333  
K



























































GX 0.53286 0.516706 0.51590  0.50081  0.50262  0.49550  0.50424  
GN 0.37794 0.35834  0.35867  0.34196  0.34921  0.34304  0.36406  
RE 0.15491 0.15837  0.15724  0.15885  0.15341  0.15246  0.14018 
g 0.01858 0.01858  0.01858  0.01858  0.01858  0.01858  0.01858  
L
NV  0.20720 0.21124  0.21116  0.21535  0.21409  0.216583 0.21265  
  %T 10.41% 11.21% 11.44% 12.14% 12.59% 12.70% 13.25% 






























































 In Table 10 we show corresponding results when the household is taken as the 
income unit, both with and without sample weighting. All variables are affected by 
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changing the unit of analysis and weighting method.21 For most of the variables, the 
result using equivalent adults gives the median of the values for the three methods.22 
Table 10.  Redistributive Effect by Unit of Analysis and Weighting Method, 2004 
 Household, unweighted23 Household, weighted Equivalent adult, weighted 
bandwidth (groups) 500 (1,537) 500 (1,537) 500 (1,537) 
total # of units 76,387  113,146,422  163,622,962  
GX 0.50113    0.51720    0.50081    
GX-T 0.47108    0.49074   0.47126    
RET 0.03005  (6.00%)  0.02646  (5.12%) 0.02954  (5.90%) 
t 0.22632    0.23203   0.22828    
K
TP  0.11455    0.10044   0.11235    
K
TV   0.03351    0.03035   0.03323    
V  0.03354  (111.59%) 0.03038  (114.81%) 0.03326  (112.57%) 










RK  0.00346  (11.50%) 0.00388  (14.68%) 0.00369  (12.49%) 
GX 0.50113    0.51720   0.50081    
GX+B 0.38585    0.39127   0.38774    
REB 0.11528  (23.00%) 0.12593  (24.35%) 0.11307  (22.58%) 
b 0.20756    0.23309   0.20970    
K
BP  0.90147    0.89999   0.88549    
K
BV   0.15495    0.17013   0.15350    
V  0.15393  (133.52%) 0.16901  (134.21%) 0.15276  (135.10%) 











RK  0.03967  (34.41%) 0.04420  (35.10%) 0.04043  (35.76%) 
Net taxes GX 0.50113    0.51720    0.50081    
(N=T-B) GN 0.33932    0.34613   0.34196    
 REN 0.16181  (32.29%) 0.17108  (33.08%) 0.15885  (31.72%) 
 g 0.01875    -0.00106   0.01858    
 )( KNP  (11.36100)    (-219.5798)   (11.37218)    
 LNV  0.21712    0.23285   0.21535   
 %T 0.02642  (12.17%) 0.02328  (10.00%) 0.02613  (12.14%) 
 %B 0.19069  (87.83%) 0.20956  (90.00%) 0.18920  (87.86%) 
 V  0.21588  (133.41%) 0.23148  (135.31%) 0.21444  (135.00%) 
 H  -0.00124  (-0.77%) -0.00137  (-0.80%) -0.00091  (-0.57%) 
 RK 0.05531  (34.18%) 0.06178  (36.11%) 0.05650  (35.57%) 
 
                                                
21 Note the instability in the value and sign of g, the net tax rate, and the abnormal levels of net progressivity KNP , especially for weighted 
households. As Lambert (1985) warned, the Kakwani index can be unsuitable for measuring net progressivity in such circumstances.   
22 Decoster and Ooghe (2003) discuss and compare the three methods using graphic examples, and go on to a alyze a proposed Belgian 
personal income tax reform using each.  Interestingly, they claim “quite fanciful results with respect to the choice of equivalence scales” 
(page 189). 
23 The MATLAB procedures developed by Ivica Urban (and dopted in UL) were used for the unweighted household calculations in this 
table. We acknowledge Ivica’s support.  
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 As the bandwidth defining close equals groups in or ginal income changes, the 
values of V and H also shift. However, not all variables depend on the bandwidth.24 Table 
11 shows the variations in those vertical, horizontal and reranking measures which are 
affected when the bandwidth for close equals is changed.25 Generally, as the bandwidth is 
increased, vertical effects reduce and horizontal effects rise (as also noted in Aronson et 
al.). V is maximized when bandwidth is set at $500, but VA is maximized when the 
bandwidth is $1,000. We chose $500 as the bandwidth in 2005.  
Table 11. Redistributive Effect by Close Equals Groups Bandwidth 
bandwidth V  VK
T H  HA  RA  
$100  0.04822711  0.04814720  0.00000001  0.00003295  0.00153035  
$200  0.04822659  0.04818290  -0.00000051  0.00006472  0.00153427  
$300  0.04822688  0.04820173  -0.00000022  0.00009551  0.00152231  
$400  0.04822611  0.04820866  -0.00000099  0.00012518  0.00149958  
$500  0.04822715  0.04821430  0.00000005  0.00015413  0.00147627  
$600  0.04822491  0.04821496  -0.00000220  0.00018177  0.00144928  
$700  0.04822477  0.04821558  -0.00000233  0.00020833  0.00142334  
$800  0.04822316  0.04821604  -0.00000395  0.00023424  0.00139789  
$900  0.04821825  0.04821187  -0.00000885  0.00025884  0.00136912  
$1,000  0.04822450  0.04821858  -0.00000260  0.00028396  0.00135071  
$1,100  0.04821598  0.04821087  -0.00001112  0.00030583  0.00132113  
$1,200  0.04822084  0.04821615  -0.00000626  0.00032973  0.00130251  
$1,500  0.04821244  0.04820894  -0.00001466  0.00039195  0.00123308  
$1,700  0.04821117  0.04820815  -0.00001593  0.00042918  0.00119506  
$2,000  0.04820314  0.04820069  -0.00002396  0.00048040  .00113639  
$2,500  0.04819108  0.04818898  -0.00003603  0.00055252  0.00105255  
$3,000  0.04817126  0.04816975  -0.00005584  0.00061005  0.00097579  
  
 Wagstaff et al. (1999) and Hyun and Lim (2005) both use the Aronson et al. 
methodology, the former for 12 OECD countries including the U.S. (1987) and the latter 
for the Korean income tax system. Table 12 compares results. For better comparability, in 
this table we have also used the Aronson et al. methodology with our U.S. data and have 
                                                
24 The Gini indices GX, GX-T, GX-B, and GN, the redistributive effect RE, the average rates of taxes, benefits, and net taxs (t, b and g), 




PB ), the vertical contributions ( ,
K K
V VT B  and )
L
VN , and the reranking effect 
RK  all stay the same. 
25 Within the unvarying RK, not surprisingly within-groups reranking increases, and entire group reranking declines as the bandwidth is 
raised.  
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chosen the same unit of analysis (the household), and the same sampling weights, 
equivalence scale, income definition, and bandwidths of equals groups (in real terms).26  
Table 12. Comparison with Other Studies 
 Gx GX-T RE t 
K
TP  VT
K (%) HA (%) RA (%) 
Wagstaff et al.(1999) 
Denmark (1987)  0.3023 0.2703 0.0320 0.2966 0.0938 123.8% 1.9% 21.9% 
Finland (1990)  0.2685 0.2253 0.0432 0.2188 0.1644 106.7% 1.0% 5.7% 
France (1989)  0.3219 0.3065 0.0154 0.0620 0.2717 116.6% 1.9% 14.8% 
Germany (1988)  0.2591 0.2312 0.0279 0.1108 0.2433 108.5% 1.3% 7.3% 
Ireland (1987)  0.3870 0.3418 0.0452 0.1540 0.2685 108.2% 1.0% 7.3% 
Italy (1991) 0.3248 0.3009 0.0239 0.1354 0.1554 102.0% 0.4% 1.6% 
Netherlands (1992)  0.2846 0.2517 0.0329 0.1487 0.1977 104.9% 0.7% 4.2% 
Spain (1990)  0.4083 0.3694 0.0389 0.1397 0.2545 106.1% 0.4% 5.7% 
Sweden (1990)  0.3004 0.2608 0.0396 0.3270 0.0891 109.3% 1.5% 7.8% 
Switzerland (1992)  0.2716 0.2541 0.0174 0.1210 0.1528 120.7% 1.7% 19.0% 
U.K. (1993)  0.4121 0.3768 0.0352 0.1421 0.2278 107.1% 0.9% 6.3% 
U.S. (1987) 0.4049 0.3673 0.0376 0.1370 0.2371 102.6% 0.4% 1.9% 
OECD12 Average 0.3288 0.2963 0.0324 0.1661 0.1963 109.7% 1.1% 8.6% 
Hyun & Lim (2005) 
Korea (1991) 0.3472 0.3246 0.0226 0.0652 0.4116 126.8 23.1% 3.7% 
Korea (1996) 0.3368 0.3188 0.0180 0.0660 0.4016 157.4 49.5% 7.9% 
Korea (2000) 0.4008 0.3790 0.0218 0.0691 0.4264 128.7 25.2% 3.5% 
This article 
U.S. (1994) 0.3707 0.3251 0.0456 0.1344 0.3164 107.3% 0.4% 6.9% 
U.S. (1999) 0.4028 0.3514 0.0514 0.1490 0.3016 102.7% 0.3% 2.3% 
U.S. (2004) 0.3933 0.3482 0.0451 0.1224 0.3340 103.2% 0.4% 2.8% 
 
 For most of the OECD personal income taxes which Wagstaff et al. (1999) cover, 
differential tax treatment effects are far less important than progressivity.27 The U.S. 
income tax in 1987 was fairly progressive by international standards. From our own 
findings, tax progressivity in the U.S. in 1994, 1999 and 2004 was higher than in all other 
countries except Korea. Compared to the OECD average, the U.S. income tax system was 
more progressive, and showed low H and R values, but had a relatively low tax burden. 
Korea’s income tax has a relatively low redistributve effect because, as Hyun and Lim 
explain, of a low average rate despite high progressivity. Horizontal inequity is very high 
in Korea compared to the U.S. and also to other OECD countries. If horizontal inequity in 
the Korean income tax could be eliminated, redistribu ive effect would improve between 
27 percent (1991) and 57 percent (1996).  
                                                
26 A major difference, however, is that Wagstaff et al. use National Medical Expenditure Survey data for the U.S., whereas we use CPS 
data.  
27 Wagstaff et al. conducted regression analysis, the results of which indicate that countries with income tax systems which rely heavily on 
tax credits and making extensive use of non-standard eductions are the most likely to exhibit high discrepancies between actual and 
potential redistributive effect. 
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7.  Summary, implications and conclusions 
 We summarize here our main findings in respect of he U.S. tax and benefit 
system, in a series of bullet points and graphs. These show the richness of the conclusions 
which the Lambert (1985) and Urban and Lambert (2005) analysis is capable of: 
• Inequality in market income has increased during the last ten years, and inequality 
in final income was higher in 2004 than in 1994. The redistributive effect of taxes and 
public transfers, as a proportion of market income inequality, slightly decreased overall.  
• Public transfers alone reduced inequality in 2004 by 22.6 percent, and income tax 
with EITC reduced inequality by 6.8 percent. Public assistance including both cash and 
non-cash benefits, and means-tested cash transfer programs such as TANF and SSI, had 
lesser roles. Both property tax and payroll tax increased inequality because of their 
regressivity.  
• Progressivity in all taxes taken together, and in the income tax alone, has 
gradually decreased, reducing the redistributive eff ct. On the other hand, the regressivity 
of overall benefits has strengthened. However, if only public assistance programs and 
means-tested cash transfers are considered, regressivity has gradually declined. 
• Benefits contribute seven times more than taxes to reduce income inequality, and 
the role of benefits has increased since 1994. The impact of differential treatment in taxes 
and benefits has increased since 1999. Total redistibutive effect could be increased 35 
percent if horizontal inequity and, much more importantly, reranking in taxes and public 
transfers could have been eliminated in 2004.  
• For taxes, redistributive effect is maximal in the case of income tax plus EITC. In 
the case of benefits, redistributive effect is maximal for public transfers. On the other 
hand, the income tax plus EITC is the most progressiv  among tax concepts, but has the 
lowest rate, whilst public transfers have the highest benefit rate and less regressivity than 
public assistance. Means-tested cash transfers have t e highest regressivity, but they have 
little impact on inequality because of their relatively low rate.  
• The U.S. income tax system is more redistributive than the average of the OECD 
countries. It has more progressivity, but a lower aver ge rate. Differential tax treatments 
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are low in the U.S. compared to other OECD countries. Korea’s income tax system has 
twice the progressivity as the OECD average, but it has a lower redistributive effect due 
to seriously high horizontal inequity.  
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Graph 5. Trends in Progressivity and Regressivity 
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Table 13.  Redistributive Effect of Different Parts of the Tax and Transfer System, 2004 
 RE (%)  t or b (%) PK (H+RK)(%)  Pro-Poor Pro-Rich 
All Taxes 5.9% 22.8% 0.11 12.6% O  
Income Tax 6.8% 14.8% 0.21 5.5% O  
Federal Income Tax 6.1% 11.4% 0.25 4.5% O  
State Income Tax 0.9% 3.1% 0.14 2.8% O  
Payroll Tax -0.5% 6.4 -0.03 -5.2%  O 
Property Tax -1.2% 2.0% -0.24 -17.6%  O 
All Public Transfers 22.6% 21.0% 0.89 35.1% O  
Public Assistance 5.7% 3.4% 1.06 19.6% O  
Means-tested Cash 1.1% 0.5% 1.13 10.8% O  
EITC 0.7% 0.4% 0.92 1.8% O  
 
 If policy-makers sought to improve redistributive effect to the exclusion of all 
other objectives, what could we advise as a result of this study? To improve the vertical 
stance of the U.S. tax system, the tax burden on the ric  should be raised along with the 
average rate (i.e. total revenue). Horizontally, deductions and exemptions should be 
minimized and omitted sources should be taxed. Public transfers to support low income 
people directly will increase distributive justice as well as the quality of life. Of course, 
with non-income factors such as age, sex, and disability rather than income level 
determining eligibility for transfer programs, percived horizontal inequity will remain.  
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 The regressivities of payroll and property taxes evidently need to be reduced, and 
expanding the proportion of progressive direct taxes rather than indirect taxes will be 
desirable. Public assistance programs have decreased in both scale and redistributive 
effectiveness during the last ten years. There is a need to expand the proportion of public 
assistance in total welfare expenditures, and enhanced regressivity will also increase the 
redistributive effect.  
 Differential treatments reduce the actual redistribu ive effect of taxes and transfers 
a great deal, and are more significant in the public transfer system than in taxes. Tax 
incentives including allowances, deductions, and exemptions should be more 
systematized. If deductions and exemptions are design d to be interlocked according to 
income level or economic needs, rather than according to non-income factors, 
redistributive effect could also be improved. 
 However, these are complex issues and of course policy-makers have other 
objectives as well as equity. Some kinds of non-income-based eligibility criteria are 
necessary to achieve the benefit programs’ other obj ctives.  
 There are some limitations related to the data used in this study. Indirect taxes are 
excluded,28 and non-cash transfers that cannot be converted ino market value directly, 
along with some other expenditures, are not available in the CPS data. In addition, the 
method of setting the appropriate bandwidth for close equals groups is not fully resolved 
theoretically, and the influence of outliers - extrme values of income, taxes or benefits – 
certainly influence results.29  
 Finally, wide agreement exists generally in public opinion that income inequality 
has increased in the U.S. during the last three decades, and our results conform with this 
view. Inequality has shown a secular increase, particularly from the 1970s to the early 
1990s. Inequality, the redistributive effects of taxes and welfare expenditures and their 
vertical and horizontal characteristics, are important concerns for policy-makers. 
Quantitative information on these, such as we have achieved in this paper, are necessary 
inputs for the achievement of distributional equity.  
                                                
28 According to Gruber (2005) taxes on consumptions, that is, consumption tax, sales tax and excise tax, occupy 38% of the State and 
local government tax revenues. 
29 For this study we converted negative earnings and market incomes to zero. We used real values for the amounts of tax and benefits. 




In the table below, we define all of the component measures invoked by Urban and 
Lambert (2005) in their study of redistributive effect in the presence of close equals 





 Redistributive Effect Index Measures according to the UL Methodology 






Order by pre-tax income 
(among exact pre-tax equals, by 
post-tax income)  




income : N1 
N1-value is the actual post-tax 
income of a unit with pre-tax 
income given by X-value at same 
position (not necessarily increasing 
order) 
D1 : post-tax  
concentration index 




VK = GX – D1 
N2 
Post-tax income vector ordered by  
by post-tax income. N2-values do 
not correspond to the X-values at 
same positions. 
GN : post-tax Gini 
index (denoted GX-T 
in (4)) 
Redistributive effect:  
RE = GX – GN   
Kakwani-reranking : 
RK = GN – D1 
N3 
Having defined close equals groups, 
order post-tax incomes by post-tax 
income within each group, and order 
the groups by pre-tax means 





RWG  =  D3 – D1  
N4 
As for N3 within groups, but order 
the groups themselves by post-tax 
means 
D4 : post-tax 
concentration index 
4 
UL’s entire group 
reranking: 
REG  =  D4 – D3  
Aronson et al ‘s 
reranking: 
RA  = GN – D4  









Pre-tax income X reduced by the 
fraction t (mean tax of the group to 
which the unit belongs). No changes 
in order given in X 
D5 : post-tax 
concentration index 
5 
UL’s vertical effect: 
V = GX – D5 
UL’s horizontal effect :  
H = D1 – D5  
N6 =X (1– t) 
As for N5 within groups, but order 
the groups themselves by post-tax 
means. 
 
D6 : post-tax 
concentration index 
6 
Aronson et al’s vertical 
and horizontal effects:  
VA = GX – D6,  
HA = D4–D6 = D3–D5 
NT 
Given by vector X – vector N1  DT : post-tax 
concentration index 
of tax (denoted CT in 
(4)) 
Kakwani index of 
progressivity : 
PK = DT – GX 
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